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Fast depleting fossil fuels and growing awareness of environmental protection have 
raised worldwide concerns, aiming to build a sustainable and smart energy ecosystem. 
Renewable energy generation plays an important role in providing clean power supply. 
However, the integration of a bulk renewable generation system would also introduce new 
forms of disturbances and uncertainties to impact the power quality, threatening the secure 
operation of the distribution network. Microgrid, as an emerging technology, is quite 
appealing to be interfaced with distribution systems due to its potential economic, 
environmental, and technical benefits. The microgrid differs from the “smart grid” with 
different control strategies to accomplish the goal of helping the power grid with load 
balancing and voltage control and assisting power markets. A hierarchical control structure 
for the microgrid is commonly designed to address all above issues both in islanded mode 
and grid-connected mode. 




rising, and enormous number of economic losses would occur if defense strategies are not 
stipulated and carried out. In the modern power system, distributed control system, intelligent 
measuring devices and Internet of Things (IoT) are highly recommended in microgrid 
systems, which lead to the vulnerability of communication channels. Cyber threats such as 
false data injection (FDI) attacks, denial of service (DoS) attacks, and time-delay switch 
attacks (TDS) can be effortlessly implemented through information and communication 
centers, compromising the secure operation of power systems. By theoretically analyzing the 
AC microgrid simulation model, the MPC control strategies, and the modified MPC method 
based on GCC estimation will be studied in this thesis. 
In the second chapter, this thesis summarizes the start-art-of microgrid control, 
introducing a hierarchical control structure: primary control, secondary control, and tertiary 
control. These control levels differ in their speed of response, the time frame in which they 
operate, and infrastructure requirements. We focus on the centralized secondary frequency 
control system, which compensates the frequency deviation caused by primary control—P/f 
method. 
Then, in Chapter 3, the isolated AC MG frequency control system including WTG, 
DEG, PV panel and energy storage system with MPC controller is modeled. Three case 
studies are designed in MATLAB/Simulink to illustrate the advantages of the MPC method 
compared with the traditional PI controller. 
In the next Chapter, since state estimation based on precise status feedback of the system 
components is essential for the MPC controller to calculate corresponding control signal, the 




switching method is proposed to detect the original statuses of BESS and FESS, updating the 
state estimation function to obtain desirable performance of frequency regulation. 
Last, considering the time delay attack hacked by the adversary in the sensor, a modified 
MPC method based on GCC estimation is proposed to detect and track time delay attacks 
online. The model of proposed method to regulate frequency deviation is built in MATLAB. 
There are three case studies in this part: a constant time-delay attack with 0.1 pu load 
increase; a time-varying delay attack with 0.1 pu load increase; and a time-varying delay 
attack with changing load disturbance. By analyzing results of three cases, the effectiveness 





© Copyright by Zhengrong Chen, 2019 





TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................................................... ii 
LIST OF FIGURES .................................................................................................................................. viii 
LIST OF TABLES ....................................................................................................................................... x 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ........................................................................................................................ xi 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ........................................................................................................................... xii 
Chapter 1：Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 MG: background and motivation ................................................................................................. 1 
1.2 MG: cyber-attack risk ................................................................................................................... 3 
1.3 Research objectives ..................................................................................................................... 5 
1.4 Thesis contribution ...................................................................................................................... 6 
Chapter 2：MG control state-of-the-art ............................................................................................... 8 
2.1 Hierarchical structure .................................................................................................................. 8 
2.2 Primary control ............................................................................................................................ 9 
2.2.1 Inverter output control ....................................................................................................... 10 
2.2.2 Power sharing control ......................................................................................................... 11 
2.3 Secondary control ...................................................................................................................... 13 
2.3.1 Centralized frequency control ............................................................................................ 13 
2.3.2 Distributed frequency control ............................................................................................ 15 
Chapter 3：MG frequency control: modelling .................................................................................... 17 
3.1 Configuration of an islanded microgrid ..................................................................................... 17 
3.1.1 Modelling of frequency response ....................................................................................... 17 
3.1.2 Characteristics of output power of WTG and PV ................................................................ 19 
3.1.3 The transfer functions of various generation subsystems .................................................. 20 
3.1.4 Transfer functions of different energy storage systems ..................................................... 20 
3.1.5 System frequency variation ................................................................................................ 21 
3.2 Conventional PI controller ......................................................................................................... 21 
3.2.1 Frequency control model .................................................................................................... 21 
3.2.2 WTG model and PV model .................................................................................................. 23 
3.2.3 Simulation in Simulink ........................................................................................................ 24 




3.3.1 Principle of MPC ................................................................................................................. 27 
3.3.2 MPC controller for MG frequency control .......................................................................... 28 
3.4 Case study .................................................................................................................................. 31 
3.4.1 Case design ......................................................................................................................... 31 
3.4.2 Simulation result and discussion ........................................................................................ 32 
Chapter 4: MPC status feedback attack ............................................................................................... 38 
4.1 Attack description ...................................................................................................................... 38 
4.2 Online switching method ............................................................................................................... 40 
4.3 Case study ...................................................................................................................................... 41 
Chapter 5: Modified MPC controller under time-delay attack ............................................................ 44 
5.1 Time delay attack ....................................................................................................................... 44 
5.2 MPC controller under time-delay attack ................................................................................... 46 
5.2.1 Modelling ............................................................................................................................ 46 
5.2.2 Case study with known time-delay signal ........................................................................... 47 
5.3 Modified MPC with online time-delay estimation ..................................................................... 50 
5.3.1 Methodology ...................................................................................................................... 50 
5.3.2 Generalized cross correlation ............................................................................................. 51 
5.3.3 Algorithm of controller design ............................................................................................ 52 
Chapter 6: Case study .......................................................................................................................... 54 
6.1 Modified MPC model simulation ............................................................................................... 54 
6.1.1 Case 1: constant time-delay attack ..................................................................................... 54 
6.1.2 Case 2: time-varying delay attack ....................................................................................... 56 
6.1.3 Case 3: two steps load disturbance .................................................................................... 57 
6.2 Discussion .................................................................................................................................. 59 
Chapter 7: Conclusion and future work ............................................................................................... 60 
7.1 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 60 
7.2 Future work ............................................................................................................................... 61 








LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1.1 Attacks on control loop ......................................................................................................... 4 
Figure 2.1 Hierarchical control levels of microgrid ............................................................................... 8 
Figure 2.2 Current and voltage control loops ...................................................................................... 10 
Figure 2.3 P-f droop curve ................................................................................................................... 12 
Figure 2.4 Q-V droop curve ................................................................................................................. 12 
Figure 2.5 Centralized secondary control system for frequency regulation ......................................... 14 
Figure 2.6 Distributed secondary control system for frequency regulation ......................................... 16 
Figure 3.1 Single-line diagram of the ac MG ...................................................................................... 18 
Figure 3.2 Conventional PI Frequency response model for the ac MG system ................................... 22 
Figure 3.3 Wind turbine output ............................................................................................................ 23 
Figure 3.4 Solar radiation  and PV output power .......................................................................... 24 
Figure 3.5 Simulink scheme-PI ........................................................................................................... 25 
Figure 3.6 (a) Multiple step load disturbances (b) MG frequency response ........................................ 26 
Figure 3.7 Frequency control following a step load disturbance of 0.1 pu .......................................... 26 
Figure 3.8 MPC framework ................................................................................................................. 28 
Figure 3.9 Simulink scheme-MPC ....................................................................................................... 30 
Figure 3.10 Case1 control system scheme ........................................................................................... 32 
Figure 3.11 Frequency control following a step load disturbance of 0.1 p.u ....................................... 33 
Figure 3.12 Case2 control system scheme ........................................................................................... 34 
Figure 3.13 Frequency control following a step load disturbance of 0.1 p.u ....................................... 35 





Figure 3.15 Case 3 frequency control following a step load disturbance of 0.1 p.u ............................ 36 
Figure 3.16 Comparison for three cases .............................................................................................. 36 
Figure 4.1 Scheme of MPC status feedback attack .............................................................................. 39 
Figure 4.2 Status feedback attack online detection block .................................................................... 40 
Figure 4.3 Frequency response under status feedback attack .............................................................. 42 
Figure 4.4 Frequency response with online switching method under status feedback attack .............. 43 
Figure 4.5 Online detection of statues of BESS and FESS .................................................................. 43 
Figure 5.1 A simplified load frequency control system under time-delay attack ................................. 45 
Figure 5.2 Dynamic model of MPC frequency control with delay attack ............................................ 46 
Figure 5.3 MPC control block diagram under attack ........................................................................... 46 
Figure 5.4 Frequency respond when =0.1s ...................................................................................... 48 
Figure 5.5 Frequency respond when =0.2s ...................................................................................... 48 
Figure 5.6 Frequency respond when =0.4s ...................................................................................... 48 
Figure 5.7 Frequency respond when =0.6s ...................................................................................... 49 
Figure 5.8 Block diagram of proposed control technique .................................................................... 50 
Figure 6.1 GCC delay estimation in case1 ........................................................................................... 55 
Figure 6.2 Frequency response following a step load disturbance of 0.1 pu ....................................... 55 
Figure 6.3 (a) Frequency output of microgrid system in case 2 (b) time-varying delay estimation ..... 56 
Figure 6.4 Two steps load disturbance ................................................................................................. 57 
Figure 6.5 GCC time delay estimation in case 3 .................................................................................. 58 









LIST OF TABLES 
TABLE I RATED POWER OF DG UNITS AND LOADS ................................................................. 18 
TABLE II THE PARAMETERS VALUES OF THE AC MG SYSTEM ............................................ 23 






LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
MG     Microgrid 
MPC    Model predictive control 
IoT     Internet of things 
FDI     False data injection 
DoS    Denial of service 
TDS    Time-delay switch 
GCC    Generalized cross correlation 
WTG    Wind turbine generation 
DEG    Diesel engine generation 
PV     Photovoltaics 
BESS    Battery energy storage system 
FESS    Flywheel energy storage system 
FC     Fuel cell 
PI     Proportional–integral 
RES    Renewable energy source 
DER     Distributed Energy Resources 
DGRs    Distributed generation resources 
DG     Distributed generators 
CHP    Combined heat and power 
LV     Low voltage 
MV     Medium voltage 
DSM     Demand side management 
PCC     Point of common coupling 
ICT     Information & communication technology 
PMU    Phasor measurement units 
LFC    Load frequency control 
LMIs    Linear matrix inequalities 
RMSE    Root-mean-square error 
VSIs    Voltage-Source Inverters 
VSC    Voltage-Source Converter 
PLL    Phase locked loop 
SISO    Single-input single-output 
MIMO    Multi-input multi-output 







I cannot express enough thanks to my advisor, Prof. Lingfeng Wang, for his constructive 
guidance in the cutting-edge research on reliability and cybersecurity of power systems and 
also for his kindness and support in my daily life and study. Moreover, I would like to thank 
Dr. Zhaoxi Liu who helped me develop the model and case studies of this thesis. 
Secondly, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to the committee members, Prof. 
Yi Hu and Prof. Zeyun Yu for their insightful and valuable comments. 
I also want to give enormous thanks to my labmates in the Laboratory of Trustworthy 
Cyber-Physical Systems and Infrastructures for your help and support.  
I am also grateful for the financial support for me to perform the research of this thesis. 
This work was supported in part by the National Science Foundation under Award 
ECCS1711617, in part by the Research Growth Initiative Program of University of Wisconsin-
Milwaukee under Award 101X360, and in part by the National Science Foundation 
Industry/University Cooperative Research Center on Grid-connected Advanced Power 
Electronic Systems (GRAPES) under Award GR-18-06. 
Finally, I am grateful for the continued support and encouragement from my parents, 






1.1 MG: background and motivation 
With the development of electrical industry, bulk power systems and reliable supply of 
energy are highly emphasized. Growing concerns for the primary energy structure and aging 
infrastructure of current electrical transmission and distribution networks are increasingly 
challenging security, reliability and quality of power supply. According to the International 
energy agency [1], energy demand is set to grow by more than 25% to 2040, requiring more 
than $2 trillion a year of investment in new energy supply. Thus, renewable energy sources 
(RESs) are mostly appealing one which can be used as alternative generation units in the 
modern power system to meet the need of efficient energy supply and low carbon economy. 
The increasing penetration of the RESs has many advantages, but also introduces new 
challenges as whether those sources can operate stable beside conventional generation units or 
not. 
It is worth noting that the power systems have always been “smart”, especially at the 
transmission level. However, the distribution level need to be transformed from passive to 
active networks, especially in the sense that control is distributed and power flows are 
bidirectional. Power generation can be linked to the customers load, taking all kinds of 
information to get the best operation point to reduce the total cost in real time. 
The microgrid concept is a quite appealing to address above problems, specifically in the 




distributed energy-storage systems. It consists of Distributed generators (DG, e.g. diesel 
engines, Micro Turbines, PV, wind turbines and CHP), storage units, Renewable energy 
Resources and loads [2-4]. Commonly, the energy-storage systems include pumped storage, 
compressed air energy storage, batteries, ultra-capacitors, flywheels, plug-in hybrid electric 
vehicles, etc. From a grid point of view, microgrids can be viewed as control entities within the 
power system. From the customer's point of view, microgrids and traditional low-voltage 
distribution networks provide heat and power requirements [5]. 
The MGs are mostly placed in the low voltage (LV) and medium voltage (MV) 
distribution networks [6]. With numerous micro-sources connected at the distribution level, 
there are new challenges, such as system stability, power quality, and network operation that 
must be resolved applying the advanced control techniques at LV/MV levels rather than high 
voltage levels which is common in conventional power system control. 
The difference between microgrid and smart grid mainly depends on their control structure. 
So proper and complicated control is required for microgrid through which we can facilitate 
the effective integration of DER and ensure the operation to be stable and economically 
efficient. The principal roles of the microgrid control structure are [2]: 
l Voltage and frequency regulation for both operating modes and seamless transition 
between two modes 
l Proper load sharing and DER coordination 
l Power flow control between the microgrid and the main grid 
l Schedule and dispatch of units under supply and demand uncertainty 




l Design of appropriate DSM schemes to allow customers to react to the grid’s need 
Microgrid can operate in both grid-connected and islanded operating modes to avoid huge 
loss caused by external faults [7]. In the grid-connected mode, active and reactive power can 
be shared through point of common coupling (PCC) connected to the main grid. So in the 
steady state, the system state e.g. voltage and frequency are necessarily following the nominal 
values. But in the islanded mode, the control issue becomes more difficult and intricate because 
of dynamic fluctuation and loss of communication with nominal points. More detailed control 
structure and advance control algorithm are required for the islanded mode to achieve voltage, 
current and frequency regulation in the MG. 
1.2 MG: cyber-attack risk 
Microgrid takes advantages of advanced control strategies, cost-competitive technologies 
and information & communication technology (ICT). In order to achieve stable and efficient 
operation of power system and DER units locally controlled, it’s necessary to expend cyber 
network inter-connectivity so that information may flow freely and correctly. But, in the 
meanwhile, the communication channel and controller in power system will become more 
vulnerable to cyber threats. A campaign of cyberattacks disabled safety systems at the Davis-
Besse nuclear power plant in 2003 [8]. In 2004, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) 
estimated the cost of the blackout is approximately $6 billion on cybersecurity threats in 
computer-based systems [9]. This large-scale blackout was caused by a software failure in the 
IT system, which shows that a deliberate attack would be much more catastrophic. In 2010, the 
Stuxnet norm was discovered, which was designed to target proprietary (Siemens) SCADA 




attackers, which was considered the first cyber-attack event causing power blackouts [11].  
Cyber attacks mainly include DoS attacks, false data injection attacks (FDI), malware, 
time-delay attacks and virus attacks. A DoS attack is a resource-exhausting attach that makes 
the server or communication network cannot provide normal services by sending a lot of 
useless command [12]. FDI attacks exploit the sensor (e.g. phasor measurement units, PMU) 
measurements by injecting false information, maliciously destroying the system performance. 
An example of FDI attacks in smart grid can be found in [13]. Time delay attacks are somehow 
like Dos attacks, which exist in power systems and influence the signals to maintain former 
state instead of current state, specifically in the sensing and control loops. The impact of time 
delays on the power system was discussed in [14-16]. 
 
Figure 1.1 Attacks on control loop 
From the view of control system, some attacks on control loop can be identified as Figure 
1.1. A1 and A3 correspond to integrity attacks, where the adversary sends false information 




correspond to DoS attacks and time-delay attacks. The adversary will prevent the controller 
from receiving correct sensor measurements or prevents actuators from receiving control 
commands. The attackers can launch a DoS attack or time-delay attacks by jamming 
communication channels, compromising devices and preventing them from sending data, 
attacking routing protocols, or flooding the network. Finally, A5 corresponds to a direct attack 
against actuators or an external physical attack on the plant [17]. 
Several studies have assessed the time delay attacks and their impact on the stability of 
power system. Reference [18] use phasor measurements with delays to design a two-level 
control structure, and small signal stability of the power system was considered. In [19], a 
delay-dependent robust method is proposed for analysis of a PID-type LFC scheme considering 
time delays. The time-delay estimator based on gradient descent method and a modified least 
mean square minimization technique was proposed in [20]. Authors in [22] take Lyaponuv-
theory and linear matrix inequalities (LMIs) techniques to analyze the delay time bound of 
stable LFC scheme. However, there are few control methods that perform online estimation of 
dynamic time delays and real-time control of power systems. Furthermore, few studies 
considered the control of power systems with time delays introduced by adversary. 
1.3 Research objectives 
The control system is the key part of the microgrid with the goal to solve the power 
dispatch issue, decrease the loss of the transmission line and improve the reliability of electric 
power system. In the traditional microgrid control system, the close-loop controllers based on 
proportional-integral-derivative (PID) are widely utilized. However, due to the complex multi-




traditional PID controllers are unable to provide a proper performance. The MPC controllers 
can be much more powerful and flexible. Besides, MPC can effectively overcome the 
uncertainty and non-linearity of the process, and deal with the variables constraints in 
processing manipulated variables [22]. 
The present thesis focuses on the MG frequency regulation, as a secondary control issue. 
There are three following objectives: 
1) Model the MG frequency control system in isolated mode 
2) Apply MPC controller as a secondary control part 
3) Consider the status feedback attack to FESS and BESS system 
4) Prevent the impact of time-delay attack in the control system 
1.4 Thesis contribution 
This thesis work has been guided by the purpose to realize frequency control in MG and 
maintain a generation-load balance. Moreover, stability of MG frequency control system is 
evaluated when considering time-delay attack in the communication channel. Then, some 
adjustments must have to be applied to eliminate the instability and devastation caused by 
adversary. 
The contribution in this thesis will be as following: 
l Modeling the isolated ac MG system including WTG, DEG, PV panel and energy 
storage system. 
l Realizing the MPC controller to control the frequency in the microgrid simulation in 
MATLAB/Simulink and comparing MPC method with the traditional PI controller to 




l Creating an online switching method which takes RMSE to identify the real statuses 
of BESS and FESS when considering the status feedback attack to the state estimation 
of MPC controller. 
l Proposing a modified MPC control algorithm based on a GCC time-delay estimation 
to obtain stable frequency regulation in real time, when considering constant or time-







Chapter 2：MG control state-of-the-art 
2.1 Hierarchical structure 
With the regard to the principal roles of the microgrid control scheme, a hierarchical 
control structure is required to address different significances and time scales among microgrid 
control demand. Hierarchical control strategy consists of three levels, namely the primary, 
secondary, and tertiary controls, as shown in Figure 2.1. These control levels differ in their (i) 
speed of response and the time frame in which they operate, and (ii) infrastructure requirements 
(e.g., communication requirements) [22,23]. 
 
Figure 2.1 Hierarchical control levels of microgrid 
The primary control, known as local control, maintains voltage and frequency stability of 




sharing (and balance) control are included in this category. It is essential to provide independent 
active and reactive power sharing controls for the DERs in the presence of both linear and 
nonlinear loads. Thus, Voltage-Source Inverters (VSIs) are used as interface for DC sources. 
Meanwhile, inverter output controllers should control and regulate the output voltages and 
currents to satisfy power sharing control. The secondary control is responsible for the reliable, 
secure and economical operation of microgrids in either grid-connected or stand-alone mode, 
compensating for the voltage and frequency deviations caused by the operation of the primary 
controls. Ultimately, the tertiary control is the highest level of control and manages the optimal 
operation of all microgrids interacted. This control level provides signals to secondary level 
controls at microgrids and other subsystems that form the full grid. Tertiary control can be 
regarded as part of the host grid, and some parts beyond the microgrid. Therefore, this control 
level is not discussed in this thesis. 
2.2 Primary control 
The primary control is designed to address the following tasks: 
l To stabilize voltage and frequency due to the mismatch between the power generated 
and consumed. 
l To offer plug and play capability for DERs and properly share the active and reactive 
power among them. 
l To regulate the currents to protect power electronic devices and the DC-link capacitor. 
As more RES are commonly used in modern power system to improve energy structure, 
voltage-source inverters (VSIs) are required as interface for DC sources (e.g. solar power and 




power sharing controller.  
2.2.1 Inverter output control 
The inverter output control typically consists of an outer loop for voltage control, and an 
inner loop for current regulation. These inner control loops are commonly referred to as zero-
level control, which have fast response speed and can keep the manipulated variables tracking 
the references [24]. 
The primary control will provide the reference points for the voltage and current control 
loops of DERs [25]. The nested voltage and frequency control loops are shown in Figure 2.2. 
The error signal, obtained by sensed signal from AC bus and reference signal, will be processed 
by voltage controller to compute the corresponding control signal. And inner current control 
loop, conventionally with additional feed-forward current compensation to regulate the current 
of VSC output.  
 
Figure 3.2 Current and voltage control loops 
In general, PI controllers are commonly used in above control loops, obtaining content 
performance of voltage and current regulation. Besides, multivariable control methods have 




stability against uncertainties in load parameters due to presence of nonlinear loads. 
2.2.2 Power sharing control 
The usual method to accomplish active and reactive power sharing is to use Q-V and P-f 
droop control algorithms [22,23,28]. When two points in the network are operating at different 
frequencies there is an increase of active power delivery from the location of higher frequency 
to the location of lower frequency. As this happens, the two frequencies tend to drift towards a 
common average value until the new steady state is reached (self-synchronizing torque). If the 
network exists mismatch for reactive power, the situation can be solved by regulating voltage 
in the system. 
When considering different configuration of converters, there are several methods to 
address active and reactive power control such as centralized [29], master-slave [30], 
decentralized [31] and droop [32]. Due to space limitation, this thesis mainly presents 2.2.3 
Droop control method. 
In droop control, the relationship between real power/frequency and reactive 
power/voltage can be expressed as [25]: 
                              (2.1) 
where  and  are the DER output voltage RMS value and nominal frequency, 
respectively. The droop coefficients, and , can be adjusted either heuristically or by 
tuning algorithms. 
By linearizing it, frequency droop characteristic is  
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The droop characteristic curve is shown in Figure 2.3 and Figure 2.4. 
 
Figure 4.3 P-f droop curve 
 
Figure 5.4 Q-V droop curve 
The advantages of droop control are that it can be implemented with no communication 
links and the control action is merely based on local information. Those features make droop 




the droop coefficients for frequency regulation in the MGs [33]. As described in [34], [35], 
frequency stability in a power system means preserving steady frequency following a heavy 
disturbance with minimum loss in loads and generation units. 
However, in the steady state, the system will settle down to a new operating point where 
the MG frequency and voltage are not equal to the nominal value. Therefore, in some studies, 
a secondary control which compensate the voltage and frequency deviations caused by the 
droop control is required to be designed. 
2.3 Secondary control 
As mentioned, secondary control is responsible for the secure, economical and reliable 
operation of the microgrid. When in the steady state, secondary control will restore the 
microgrid voltage and frequency, compensating the deviations caused by the primary control. 
This control hierarchy will have slower dynamic response than that of the primary, which 
reduces the harmonic content of the voltage waveform. 
There are two topologies for secondary control: centralized and distributed. While the 
centralized topology proposes a central controller to make decisions, the distributed topology 
allows the interaction of various units within the microgrid and realization of self-control. It’s 
obvious that the distributed approach can exhibit the desirable plug-and-play feature, which 
may be the trend of microgrid control topology.  
This thesis focuses on frequency regulation of the microgrid. A related detailed description 
of the centralized and decentralized approaches is presented next. 




The centralized secondary control scheme is depicted in Figure 2.5. In general terms, the 
frequency is usually estimated by a phase locked loop (PLL) and compared with the reference 
value . Then the secondary controller will compute a correcting signal  sending to the 
primary controller through communication link. Finally, frequency regulation of the distributed 
generation resources (DGRs) can be archived by the function of centralized secondary 
controller. In addition, centralized secondary control system can operate using a unidirectional 
low bandwidth communication channel, which may show robustness in the dynamic situation. 
The reference value  would be different for islanded mode and grid-connected mode. In the 
islanded operating mode, the reference value  can be directedly set by desirable operating 
points. On the other hand, active power of main grid needs to be considered in the grid-
connected operating mode, which is calculated by tertiary control. 
 
Figure 6.5 Centralized secondary control system for frequency regulation 







and reliable than distributed one in MGs located in developing countries and/or rural areas 
where good communication infrastructure is not always available. However, huge losses may 
occur due to a system collapse if failure happens to the communication channel. Hence, it’s 
essential to discuss the security and stability of MG secondary control. 
2.3.2 Distributed frequency control 
The distributed control framework, in comparison of the centralized control strategy, uses 
the recent advances in communication technologies, such as WiFi and Zigbee technologies, 
and also new algorithms for exchange of information (such as gossip, consensus, OpenFMB) 
[37]. A typical distributed secondary control is shown as Figure 2.6. In this case, each 
generation unit is provided with secondary control capacity to correct the frequency deviation. 
Moreover, each DGR is equipped with PLLs to estimate voltage and frequency at PCC. In some 
area, the distributed secondary control system looks promising because of its autonomous 
capacity for each DGR. But the use of high the high-bandwidth required by distributed 





Figure 7.6 Distributed secondary control system for frequency regulation 
Some efforts have been taken to mitigate the effect of communication link failures. 
Authors in [38] present a secondary control with no communications for islanded microgrids, 
where switches between two configurations according to a time-dependent protocol exist to 
archive frequency restoration. Event-trigger based secondary control methods are new 
approaches to reduce the communication band-width in [39]. Moreover, state estimation based 






Chapter 3：MG frequency control: modelling 
3.1 Configuration of an islanded microgrid 
3.1.1 Modelling of frequency response 
Combing the renewable energy resource (e.g. solar power, wind power, water energy) with 
different energy storage systems in microgrid system, the generated electric power can meet 
the requirement of connected loads. Taking the model of the isolated MG system in thesis [41], 
which is shown in Figure 3.1. The MG system contains conventional diesel engine generator 
(DEG), PV panel, wind turbine generator (WTG), fuel cell (FC) system, battery energy storage 
system (BESS), and flywheel energy storage system (FESS). As shown in Figure 3.1, the DGs 
are connected to the MG by power electronic interfaces which are used for synchronization in 
ac sources like DEG and WTG and to reverse voltage in dc sources like PV panel, FC, and 
energy storage devices. The FC contains three fuel blocks, an inverter for converting dc to ac 
voltage and an interconnection device (IC). The FC has a high-order characteristic but a three-
order model is sufficient for frequency studies [42]. Both FC and DEG are considered as parts 





Figure 8.1 Single-line diagram of the ac MG 
The circuit breaker is used in each microsource to disconnect from the network to avoid 
the impacts of severe disturbances through the MG or for maintaining purposes. Nominal 
values of the DG units and loads are given in TABLE I. 
TABLE I RATED POWER OF DG UNITS AND LOADS 
Rated power (KW) Load (KW) 
WTG 100 
 210 PV panel 30 
FC 70 
DEG 160 







The power balance function can be described as: 
                (3.1) 
where, the exchange power of FESS and BESS may be bilateral. FC and DEG are standby 
generators that deliver power to the system only when the total power generated by the WTG 
and PV is insufficient. 
To precisely simulate the dynamic behaviors of practical WTG, DEG, FC, BESS, FESS, 
PV, etc., physical system must be extracted into mathematical model. For large-scale power 
system, however, simplified models or transfer functions are generally employed.  
3.1.2 Characteristics of output power of WTG and PV 
The output power of the studied wind turbine is determined by nondimensional curves of 
power coefficient , which is a function of tip speed ratio  and blade pitch angle . The 
tip speed ratio can be defined by 
                                  (3.2) 
where (=23.5m) is the radius of blades and  (=3.14 rad/s) is the rotational 
speed of blades. The function of  is given by 
             (3.3) 
The output mechanical power of the mentioned WTG is 
                               (3.4) 
where (=1.25 ) is the air density. is the swept area of blades, which is 1735 . 
is the wind speed. 
The output power of the studied PV system is characterized by 









( 3)(0.44 0.0167 )sin 0.0184( 3)
15 0.3p
C p lb l b
b
é ù-
= - - -ê ú-ë û
31








                       (3.5) 
where  is the conversion efficiency of the PV arrays, commonly ranging from 9% to 
12%. S is the measured area of the PV array,  is the solar radiation and  is ambient 
temperature in degree Celsius. In this thesis, S=4084  and  is kept at 25 . Therefore, 
 is linearly varied with  only. 
3.1.3 The transfer functions of various generation subsystems 
The transfer functions of the WTG, PV, FC, and DEG shown in Figure 3.1 are, respectively, 
represented as given: 
       (3.6) 
       (3.7) 
     (3.8) 
      (3.9) 
3.1.4 Transfer functions of different energy storage systems 
Energy storage systems are essential to support insufficient energy of power generation 
subsystems of the microgrid system within a very short time to maintain system stability. 
Because the BESS takes time to charge energy to the battery cells or release the energy from 
the battery, its time constant is limited to several seconds. On the other hand, the FESS can 
store surplus energy during off-peak periods and quickly release energy during peak loads. The 
transfer functions of the BESS and FESS can be, respectively, expressed as a first-order lag as 
given next: 
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                         (3.10) 
                         (3.11) 
3.1.5 System frequency variation 
In the autonomous microgrid system, the total power generation must meet the total power 
demand of the connected loads to maintain the stable operation. However, due to the difference 
 between power demand reference  and total power generation , the system 
frequency would wave. Hence, P-f control method mentioned in Chapter 2 is required to track 
the reference frequency.  
                                 (3.12) 
The system frequency variation  is calculated by 
                                   (3.13) 
where  is system frequency characteristic constant of the microgrid system. The 
transfer function for system frequency variation to per unit power deviation can be expressed 
by 
                    (3.14) 
where D and M are, respectively, the equivalent inertia constant and damping constant 
[43]. 
3.2 Conventional PI controller 
3.2.1 Frequency control model 
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Figure 9.2 Conventional PI Frequency response model for the ac MG system 
After modelling the microgrid frequency control system by transfer functions, a simplified 
frequency response model is shown in Figure 3.2. Parameter values of the block diagram of all 
following cases are given in TABLE II. Conventional frequency response model for the ac MG 






TABLE II THE PARAMETERS VALUES OF THE AC MG SYSTEM 
Parameter Value Parameter Value 
D 0.015  0.08 
2H 0.1667  0.4 
 0.1  0.004 
 0.1  0.04 
 0.26 R 3 
 1  1.8 
 1  1.5 
3.2.2 WTG model and PV model 
In this thesis, the total power of the connected loads for all simulation case study is 
assumed to be 1.0 pu under normal operating condition. And  is set to be 7.5 m/s and  
is kept to be a smooth curve less than 0.3 pu. According to former assumptions, output of WTG 
and output of PV are depicted in Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4. 
 













Figure 11.4 Solar radiation  and PV output power 
It can be seen that the output of WTG and output of PV will remain stable under constant 
wind speed  and smooth . Under the circumstance of little fluctuation of WTG output 
and PV output, this thesis would mainly focus on the frequency response under obvious load 
demand disturbance. 
3.2.3 Simulation in Simulink 







Figure 12.5 Simulink scheme-PI 
To illustrate the dynamic response of the MG system, the closed-loop system is examined 
in the face of a multiple step load disturbance which is plotted in Figure 3.6 (a) and. And the 
system frequency response using conventional PI controller is shown in Figure 3.6 (b). Besides, 
conventional PI controllers are examined following a large step load disturbance of 0.1 pu as 








Figure 13.6 (a) Multiple step load disturbances (b) MG frequency response 
 
Figure 14.7 Frequency control following a step load disturbance of 0.1 pu 
where, KP=0.3, KI=2. As shown in Figure 3.6 and Figure 3.7, the PI controller shows 
robustness and keeps the frequency stable from load disturbance no matter it’s a single step 
disturbance or multiple step disturbances. The adjust time is less than 2 seconds. But the initial 
drop is still not satisfying, exceeding 0.05 pu. 
In traditional power systems, the secondary frequency control is mostly done by 




case of any change in the operating condition, the PI controllers cannot provide the assigned 
desirable performance. MPC can be used as a suitable intelligent method for online tuning of 
PI controller parameters and may get better performance. 
3.3 Model predictive control 
3.3.1 Principle of MPC 
Model predictive control technology has been widely used in SISO, MIMO and nonlinear 
system [44-46]. MPC has serval advantages:1) handle the constraints in a systematic way, 2) 
admirable implement of considering nonlinear system, 3) calculation time can be reduced to 
get optimal control. The key feature of MPC is the model representation, which can be 
described as state space, transfer matrix or convolution type models. Depending on the model, 
computation and implementation will start automatically, processing the predicted value to 
make control decision. We assume the system to be discussed in state space by 
                        (3.15) 
                                   (3.16) 
For zero-initial conditions, the equivalent transfer matrix representation is 
                                 (3.17) 
                 (3.18) 
where  are the coefficients of impulse response. Thus, in the time domain, the output 
 can be calculated by 
                              (3.19) 
Then a cost function  is defined determine the optimal control behavior at a certain 
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time (control horizon). Depending on reference variable  and predictive state variable 
,  can be designed as . The common function is square of the 
difference between the reference variable and predictive state variable . 
Naturally, control action which minimize the cost function is selected to control the system. In 
general, the most important part in MPC algorithm is the state estimation function, which 
directly influence the accuracy of predicted state values and may change the following control 
action. 
3.3.2 MPC controller for MG frequency control 
In this thesis, MPC controller is proposed to control the DEG and FC generation 
subsystem as a secondary control issue to maintain the stable frequency and power balance 
under disturbance of load demand, comparing with the conventional PI controller. The MPC 
framework for study is shown as Figure 3.8. 
 














The goal is to control  which should be equal to zero.  is the output signal of MPC 
to change the power of FC and DEG. 
The state space function of former system can be expressed as: 
                  (3.20) 
           (3.21) 
                                     (3.22) 
                                 (3.23) 
where  
              (3.24) 
                        (3.25) 
                           (3.26) 
                        (3.27) 
and , , , , ,  are the deviation of frequency, the DEG system 
output, the FC system output, the FESS system output, the BESS system output and load, 
respectively.  and  are control signals from controller. 
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   (3.28) 
The first term minimizes the tracking error between the prediction of the measured system 
frequency and its set-point , and the second term minimizes the control action effort.  
are weighting factor value, which in this thesis have been selected to obtain similar SCS 
bandwidth for MPC to that achieved for the other SCS strategies studied in this thesis.
are the minimum and maximum costing horizons, respectively, and is the control horizon. 
 are control signals processed by MPC. 
Then, MPC controller can be given by 
                              (3.29) 
The MPC Simulink scheme is shown as Figure 3.9. 
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3.4 Case study 
Power system operation states are changing in the real-time situation, which may degrade 
the performance of the closed-loop microgrid system, distressingly. As indicated in the 
previous sections, one of the main advantages of the advanced control methods is robustness 
against environmental and dynamical changes. To illustrate the robustness of MPC control 
strategy, three cases based on the different conditions of BESS and FESS are designed. In the 
meanwhile, the simulation result of MPC controller will be compared with PI controller 
mentioned before. 
3.4.1 Case design 
Microgrid can operate in both grid-connected and islanded operating modes to avoid huge 
loss caused by external faults. The control schemes for MG system in islanded mode are more 
complex and important than that in grid-connected mode; hence, an isolated ac MG system is 
considered as a case study in this thesis. In addition, the changing state of FESS and BESS may 
degrade the closed-loop system performance. Therefore, two binary variables  are 
proposed to describe the statuses of FESS and BESS system. If , the energy 
storage systems operate in idle mode which means they reach their maximum capacity limit 
and they can’t release or charge power furthermore at that status. And if , the 
energy storage systems operate in connected mode with ability to respond to the dynamic 
change of load power. According to the combination of those two variables, there are supposed 
to be 4 cases. However, due to the same transfer function of FESS and BESS, there are three 
cases shown as TABLE III. 
,FESS BESSS S
, 0FESS BESSS S =




TABLE III CASE STUDY DESIGN 
Case study   
Case1 1 1 
Case2 0 0 
Case3 1 0 
 
3.4.2 Simulation result and discussion 
Case1:  
 
Figure 17.10 Case1 control system scheme 
The block diagram of this studied case is shown as Figure 3.10. WTG and PV as renewable 
sources are combined with DEG, FC, FESS and BESS. Power inverters are properly used in 
various generation systems and energy storage systems to realize dc-ac transform. The 
frequency error sign will be sent to both FC and DEG, processed by MPC controller to respond 





MPC controller which means distributed control strategy, operating with others to obtain better 
performance. In this case, uncertainty for the parameters which would influence the output of 
WTG and PV generation is not considered. Besides, we assume that FESS and BESS have no 
limit and they have enough capacity to store or release power in the system. Thus, they may 
have faster speed for processing the frequency error signal produced by . So output 
signals from BESS and FESS function are negative, to a certain degree, like a simple droop 
control. 
 
Figure 18.11 Frequency control following a step load disturbance of 0.1 p.u 
There are two separate control signals from MPC sent to FC and DEG system to produce 
corresponding power. The cooperation of two manipulated signals from MPC can obtain better 
performance with less adjustment time. 
where, sampling time is 0.01s, prediction horizon is 80 steps, control horizon is 4 steps, 
. 










Figure 19.12 Case2 control system scheme 
The block diagram of this studied case is shown as Figure 3.12. WTG and PV as renewable 
sources are combined with DEG, FC. Power inverters are properly used in various generation 
systems and energy storage systems to realize dc-ac transform. The frequency error sign will 
be sent to both FC and DEG, processed by MPC controller to respond to dynamic change of 
the connected load power. Assume that FC and DEG have their own MPC controller which 
means distributed control strategy, operating with others to obtain better performance. In this 
case, uncertainty for the parameters which would influence the output of WTG and PV 
generation is not considered. Unlike case1, FESS and BESS lose their ability to respond  
at high speed. In other words, they may just communicate with WTG and PV to charge or 






Figure 20.13 Frequency control following a step load disturbance of 0.1 p.u 
The frequency response is shown as Figure 3.13. 
Case3: 
 
Figure 21.14 Case3 control system scheme 
The block diagram of this studied case is shown as above. Almost part of this case is the 
same as case1 while the BESS are removed from the system. The FC and PV may generate dc 




limit and they have enough capacity to store or release power in the system. 
The frequency response is shown as Figure 3.15. 
 
Figure 22.15 Case 3 frequency control following a step load disturbance of 0.1 p.u 
 
Figure 23.16 Comparison for three cases 
From Figure 3.11, Figure 3.13 and Figure 3.15, we can find that the MPC controller has 
less overshoot and fast response speed. Frequency deviation in three case for MPC controller 
are all less than 0.05 pu, reaching the desirable operation demand. It can be seen clearly that 
case 1 has the best performance from Figure 3.16, since BESS and FESS have the ability to 




loss their responsible ability, there is little difference between PI control method and MPC 
control method (seen as case 2). In summary, through case study, it shows the advantage of 







Chapter 4: MPC status feedback attack 
4.1 Attack description 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, various status feedback of FESS and BESS  may 
contribute to different performances of the closed-loop system. Due to the same transfer 
function of FESS and BESS, there are three conditions related to the status of FESS and BESS, 
illustrating whether they are connected to the system or not. All three conditions can achieve 
frequency regulation, but the overshoot and response speed are totally different as they can be 
distinguished easily. State estimation based on accuracy status feedback of the system 
components is essential for the MPC controller to calculate corresponding control signal. If 
status feedback of BESS and FESS are attacked by adversary, it may degrade the performance 
of power system, causing huge of losses. For example, only BESS is available when the load 
demand increases which means . However, after attacks is implemented in MPC, 
the state estimator would receive the wrong information that both of FESS and BESS are still 
on work to handle the power unbalance, which means . It may lead to risky 
control strategy and terrific performance of system operation, producing impacts on reliability 
and security of power grid. The scheme under MPC status feedback attack is depicted as Figure 
4.1.  
,FESS BESSS S
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Figure 24.1 Scheme of MPC status feedback attack 
From Figure 4.1, we can see that the hacker may get the access to attack state estimation of 
MPC by injecting false data. Actually, the status feedback of WTG, PV, DEG and FC all can 
be attacked. For simplicity, we only consider the attack to the statuses of FESS and BESS. 
Further detection and online switching from different conditions are required to address status 
feedback attack. We assume that if the frequency deviation is found to be different from what 
it supposed to be, the state space of the system can be modified immediately. Then we need to 
classify the actual situation among above three cases. New calculation and optimization 
progress would be done automatically after the accuracy state space function and current states 




4.2 Online switching method 
Due to different statues of BESS and FESS, the state space functions that describe the dynamic 
model of mentioned microgrid system vary from one to the other. Only with the accuracy state 
space function, the state estimation can be processed properly, and the deviation of frequency 
can be regulated. As the historical data of MPC output control signal  are known, the 
estimated frequency deviation of former three situations ( , ,
) can be obtained. Euclidean metric is proposed to measure the relativity of 
current frequency deviation and the estimated frequency deviation. If we compare current data 
and mentioned estimated data, we can detect the statuses of BESS and FESS where the less 
error one can be recognized as actual statuses. Status feedback attack online detection block is 
shown as Figure 4.2.  
 
Figure 25.2 Status feedback attack online detection block 
Although the state estimation is hacked by adversary at first, which may lead to terrific 
u
=0, =0FESS BESSS S =1, =0FESS BESSS S




performance of system operation, a status feedback attack online detection is proposed to 
address this problem. According to the state space function of each situation shown as status 
block in Figure 4.2,  can be calculated respectively during specific observation time. 
Then RMSE (Root Mean Squared Error) block is utilized to measure the error when comparing 
 with . Then the less error one is approximately considered as current updated 
status feedback of BESS and FESS. Therefore, the MPC controller is modified by updated 
status feedback in real time. In next control step, predicted states and control signal are 
computed by the updated state space function of actual model related to statuses of BESS and 
FESS.  
4.3 Case study 
In this case, FESS and BESS system are in idle mode ( ) which means they reach 
their maximum capacity limit and they can’t release or charge power furthermore at that status. 
However, the state estimations of FESS and BESS system are hacked by the intruder, resulting 
the status feedback from BESS and FESS to be . As the MPC controller takes the 
wrong status feedback, control signal would be totally different from what it should be in the 
regular operation. Therefore, inevitable damage and insufficient control function may be 
occurred in the respect of dynamic model of frequency secondary control based on MPC. 
1 2 3, ,f f fD D D
1 2 3, ,f f fD D D fD
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Figure 26.3 Frequency response under status feedback attack 
The frequency response of mentioned case with 0.1 pu load disturbance at t=2s is depicted as 
Figure 4.3, which is simulated in MATLAB. It can be seen that such status feedback attack 
would cause system instability and slightly obtain the expectation of frequency control. 
Then, the proposed online detection and switching method with 0.1 pu load disturbance at t=2s 
is implemented in simulation. The result of system frequency response and online detection of 
statues of BESS and FESS are shown as Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6, respectively. From Figure 
4.4 and Figure 4.5, we can verify the effectiveness of the proposed method to achieve frequency 
regulation with the MPC controller as secondary control part. In Figure 4.6, when t=2.05s, the 
algorithm can detect the accuracy status feedback of FESS and BESS, where BESS, FESS=00 
represents . Therefore, the MPC controller can modify the state estimation with 
the original states of FESS and BESS. 





Figure 27.4 Frequency response with online switching method under status feedback attack 
 






Chapter 5: Modified MPC controller under time-delay attack 
5.1 Time delay attack 
Modern power grids rely on open communication infrastructure to improve the efficiency, 
sustainability and reliability of three levels of power system (generation, transmission and 
distribution), which makes them vulnerable to cyber-attacks implemented by adversary. In 
general, an intruder attempts to get into IT infrastructure of control system and manipulate 
various sensors to disrupt control signals. For example, an intruder can shut down a load on a 
specific power transformer or introduce inefficiencies in the power supply.  
Many efforts have culminated in a huge number of literature, including stability analyzing 
method of attacks on industrial control systems, updating hardware and software systems and 
advanced measurement units to prevent potential attacks from destroying secure operation. An 
identifying method for a change in sets of inferred candidate invariants under FDI attack is 
proposed in [47]. Literature [48] studies the impact of FDI on distributed load sharing. In [49], 
Markov based state transition rules is presented to simulate microgrid responses considering 
the behavior of PV and ESS control systems. Authors in [50] consider how a time-delay attack 
affects the dynamic performance of a power system. 
Commonly, the local information measured by sensors is sent to the communication 
channel. Then state estimator starts to calculate current states which is essential for making 
control decision in control center. After receiving the signal from control center, frequency 
controller can send the control signal to all kinds of DEG through the communication channel. 




to various attack risks. A simplified load frequency control system under time-delay attack is 
depicted in Figure 5.1. However, most of recent studies considered either the construction of 
controllers that are robust to time delays or controllers that train offline with a time-delay 
function for estimation. As far as it is known, there are few control methods that perform online 
estimation of dynamic time delays and real-time control of power systems. 
 







5.2 MPC controller under time-delay attack 
5.2.1 Modelling 
 
Figure 30.2 Dynamic model of MPC frequency control with delay attack 
The model of conventional MPC control scheme is modified, shown in Figure 5.2, 
considering the time delay attack in the control loop. 
  
Figure 31.3 MPC control block diagram under attack 
The deviation of frequency of plant output, which is detected by sensor (PLL in microgrid), 
will be compared to reference signal r. However, the sensed data will be delayed due to time-




not corresponding to real system state, and fluctuation of frequency and undesirable 
performance would occur. 
The state space function of former system can be expressed as same as formula 3.20. 
Besides, as shown by an exponential block ,  is the estimated time delay of the system. 
With the time-delay attack, the control signal will be modified by 
                                     (5.1) 
And the new state after attack can be modeled by 
                            (5.2) 
Since a time-delay attack can sabotage and ruin the network control system to cause huge 
loss, control strategies must be developed that must be able to detect and track the time-delay 
attack and manage a response strategy. 
5.2.2 Case study with known time-delay signal 
In this case, time delay  is assumed to be known in system. Under four different delay 
time and 0.1 pu load disturbance at 2s, the frequency respond of microgrid system with MPC 
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Figure 32.4 Frequency respond when =0.1s 
 
Figure 33.5 Frequency respond when =0.2s 
 








Figure 35.7 Frequency respond when =0.6s 
where, sampling time is 0.01s, prediction horizon is 80 steps, control horizon is 4 steps, 
. 
It can be seen clearly that MPC controllers will obtain better performance (less overshoot, 
faster adjust time, stable curve) of microgrid frequency control than PI controllers with 
increasing delay time. Even when  is larger than 0.6s, the frequency respond of PI controller 
will be divergent. Under the situation of known time-delay, MPC controllers are promising. 
However, in the real power system, it’s impossible to get the exact information of time-delay 
attack by adversary instant immediately, or time-delay attack can be time-varying. Therefore, 
it’s indispensable to set up a new algorithm to prevent time-delay attack on microgrid frequency 
control system in real-time. 
  
t






5.3 Modified MPC with online time-delay estimation 
5.3.1 Methodology 
The new method involves the use of the plant model, a time-delay estimator, and the MPC 
controller to control system frequency under TDS attack. The control scheme will detect and 
track time delays introduced by a hacker and guide the plant to track the reference signal to 
guarantee the stability for the system. Figure 5.8 shows the diagram of proposed control method. 
 
Figure 36.8 Block diagram of proposed control technique 
This thesis proposes a GCC (generalized cross correlation) time-delay estimator to update 
delay estimation. Then the state space can be modified with estimated time-delay. According 
to the updated plant model, MPC controller could adjust their control signal to eliminate the 
fluctuation caused by unknown delay attack. 
For simplification, the system being dealt with can be approximated in state space function, 
which takes plant block directly to describe the dynamic of system. 
                      (5.3) 
 




and its solution is given by 
                     (5.4) 
Due to the time-delay attack from the attacker, the solution becomes 
                (5.5) 
In general, the time delay  is an unknown variable. No matter it is a constant or time-
varying value, we want to estimate the time delay . 
It should be noted that  is actually measured from sensor. So, at every instance of 
time, variable and  are known to the controller and the plant model. On the 
other hand, the current  and the time delay are unknown. It is essential to estimate the 
time delay firstly and then estimates  correctly. 
Assume that former state can be obtained at every time step. The plant model estimation 
equation is given by  
                    (5.6) 
Through the plant model estimation, we can calculate the estimated state value  since 
 are known and former  processed by MPC controller are saved. Then, GCC 
estimator can be used to estimate time delay  by comparing  and . So it’s 
definitely important to get the plant model state estimation in order to estimate time delay attack 
to the communication channel. 
5.3.2 Generalized cross correlation 
GCC algorithm is widely used in field of signal processing to estimate the time delay 
between two signals [51-52]. In some sense, the output signal from sensors and state estimate 
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signal are two related signals, which can also use GCC to detect and track time delay. 
For convenient,  and  can be mathematically remarked as 
                        (5.7) 
                             (5.8) 
where  is real signal obtained from sensor,  is noise signal. Signal  is 
assumed to be uncorrelated with . 
Here, the cross-correlation function is proposed to determine the time delay D as formula 
5.9. 
            (5.9) 
where E denotes expectation，T is observation interval. The peak of cross correlation 
function provides an estimate of delay. GCC is aimed to improve the accuracy of the delay 
estimate  where  and  are filtered. Therefore, the generalized cross correlation 
function based on the phase transform (PHAT) between  and  is 
                 (5.10) 
                          (5.11) 
Ideally, the PHAT weighting function delivers an ideal GCC: 
                        (5.12) 
                        (5.13) 
5.3.3 Algorithm of controller design 
Step 1: Initialize time-delay estimate , plant model state estimate , reference signal r 
and MPC controller state xmpc. 
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Step 2: Obtain a plant state measurement (i.e., the sensed output states of the plant 
), which could be hacked by attackers. 
Step 3: Compute the current state estimate, , according to the plant state space model. 
The discrete equation can be approximated as: 
 
Step 4: Use GCC algorithm to compute the time-delay estimate  by comparing 
historical data  and . In order to reduce the computation complexity, an 
observation interval T is utilized to compute the cross-correlation function.  
Step 5: Modify MPC controller state model with time-delay estimate  obtained in step 
3. And then compute the new MPC controller state xmpc.  
Step 6: Compute the control signal  in the MPC controller. As new MPC controller 
state xmpc and the input of MPC controller  are known, can be set by MPC 
algorithm. 
Step 7: To prevent runaway and dead-zone situations, bound time-delay estimate by  
and the control signal by . 
Step 8: Repeat step 2-7 in the case of tracking a reference trajectory r. 
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Chapter 6: Case study 
6.1 Modified MPC model simulation 
To verify the effectiveness and advantages of modified MPC control strategy, three cases 
are designed to analyze the microgrid frequency response: 
1). A constant time-delay attack is applied into system with 0.1 pu load increase 
2). A time-varying delay attack is applied into system with 0.1 pu load increase 
3). A time-varying delay attack is applied into system with changing load disturbance 
By simulating those three cases, the time window of GCC is set as 2s and the MPC 
controller will be implemented in MATLAB. 
6.1.1 Case 1: constant time-delay attack 
In this case, the system works in islanded mode. Then, load power increases 0.1 pu since 
t=2s, and a 0.2s constant time-delay attack is applied into communication channel. Taking the 
modified MPC control method, online delay estimation and the system frequency control 





Figure 37.1 GCC delay estimation in case1 
 
Figure 38.2 Frequency response following a step load disturbance of 0.1 pu 
From Figure 6.1, we can see that GCC estimation method can detect and track the time-
delay attack with approximately 0.5s error, which is quite appealing. Thus, after acquiring 
accurate delay time, the state estimation in MPC can work as condition. It can be observed in 




stable with less than 3s adjustment time and 0.02 pu overshoot. On the other side, traditional 
MPC needs 10s to realize secondary frequency control and has worse control performance. 
6.1.2 Case 2: time-varying delay attack 
Case 2 are almost similar to Case 1, except for the delay attack signal. In this case, time 
delay is 0.2s from t=2s to t=3s and it changes to 0.4s after t=3s. Figure 6.3 shows the frequency 
output of system and time-varying delay estimation. Load power increases 0.1 pu since t=2s, 
causing a frequency decrease by the function as droop control at first. Therefore, MPC as a 
secondary frequency control scheme is designed to balance the power generation and load 
demand to control the frequency. 
 
Figure 39.3 (a) Frequency output of microgrid system in case 2 (b) time-varying delay estimation 
It shows that modified MPC algorithm based on GCC estimation can also obtain satisfying 




and the overshoot is about 0.02 pu. Under this circumstance, even when the time-delay attack 
changes with a short interval, the proposed method will compensate the frequency deviation as 
the function of secondary frequency control system. 
6.1.3 Case 3: two steps load disturbance 
In this case, load disturbance has two steps where it’s 0.1 pu from t=2s to t=10s and 0.2 
pu after t=10s, which is shown in Figure 6.4. On the other hand, time delay is 0.2s from t=2s 
to t=10s and it changes to 0.4s after t=10s. Figure 6.5 and Figure 6.6 show time-varying delay 
estimation and the frequency response of microgrid system, respectively. 
 





Figure 41.5 GCC time delay estimation in case 3 
 
Figure 42.6 Frequency response in case 3 
From Figure 6.5, GCC estimation can track the original time-delay attack correctly with 
little deviation. From Figure 6.6, we can see that there are two peaks when =0.4s, which 






process is more severe than the former period. But the result can still verify the effectiveness 
of modified MPC control method under two steps load disturbance with time-varying delay 
attack. 
6.2 Discussion 
After analyzing the results of the three case studies mentioned above, we can gain the 
following conclusions: 
(1) The proposed modified MPC can handle the risk under constant and time-varying 
delay, managing short-term load disturbance successfully. Time-delay attack can be detected 
and time-delay tracked by GCC method. 
(2) The modified MPC control strategy can keep the frequency of microgrid stable under 
different load disturbance and various time delay attack (e.g. one changing fast in a short time) 
in real-time operation. 
(3) The key part of Modified MPC control strategy is the GCC time-delay estimator, which 
directly influence the model description and performance of dynamic system. The maximum 
of time delay attack that the proposed method can handle is 0.8s, otherwise the frequency 
deviation will be divergent. 
(4) After some experiments, various observation time of GCC, during which cross 
correlation function is calculated to obtain time delay estimation, may lead to different 





Chapter 7: Conclusion and future work 
7.1 Conclusion 
In this thesis, the hierarchical structure of microgrid control systems is studied by 
introducing primary, secondary, and tertiary controls to address different significances and time 
scales among microgrid control demand. We focus on the secondary frequency control system. 
The studied islanded microgrid consists of DEG, PV panel, WTG, FC system, BESS, and FESS. 
All above components can be described by transfer function as a first-order model. Then, the 
conventional PI controller is simulated in Simulink to compensate frequency deviation under 
load disturbance. However, in case of any change in the operating conditions, the PI controllers 
cannot provide the assigned desirable performance. MPC is applied as a suitable intelligent 
method to compare with the PI controller. The results simulated in MATLAB show that the 
MPC controller has less overshoot and faster response speed, reaching the desirable operation 
demand. Three case studies in Chapter 3 verify the robustness of the MPC controller under 
dynamic change. 
On the other side, we find that BESS and FESS have the ability to supply insufficient 
generation subsystems within a short time. When BESS and FESS lose their responsible ability, 
there is trifling difference between the PI control method and the MPC control method. The 
status feedback attack to the MPC controller is considered. The wrong status feedback of BESS 
and FESS systems may lead to unrecoverable instability to the microgrid system. Therefore, 




of BESS and FESS. A simple case study is designed to analyze the detriment caused by the 
status feedback attack and to verify the effectiveness of the proposed method to protect the 
control system from such an attack. 
Regarding the cyber-security of the microgrid system, time delay attack occurred in the 
communication channel by an adversary is mainly discussed. To prevent the secondary 
frequency control of the microgrid system from time-delay attacks, a modified MPC method 
based on GCC estimation is proposed. During the online operation, time delay can be estimated 
by GCC and then the state estimation in MPC controller can update. According to the updated 
plant model, the MPC controller could adjust its control signal to eliminate the fluctuation 
caused by unknown delay attacks. Finally, the proposed modified MPC can detect and track 
both constant and time-varying delays, keeping the frequency of the system successfully stable. 
7.2 Future work 
In this section, recommendations for future work are listed. 
1. Various observation time of GCC, during which cross correlation function is 
calculated to obtain time delay estimation, may lead to different estimation results. In this 
thesis, the observation time of GCC is set as 2s. Besides, the maximum of time delay 
attack under proposed method is 0.8s. In the future, some adjustment should be made in 
improving the accuracy of GCC estimation. 
2. In this thesis, only the LTI system in state feedback was discussed, though the method 
is general in essence. In the future research, the method will be verified that it also works 
for a class of nonlinear systems. 




remain a smooth curve. However, in the real microgrid system, we need to consider the 
disturbance of wind speed and solar radiation. For my future work, more case studies 
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